{"id":978,"date":"2026-11-06T04:36:00","date_gmt":"2026-11-06T04:36:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/attackers-abuse-microsoft-teams-ad-cs-steal-company-data\/"},"modified":"2026-11-07T00:50:26","modified_gmt":"2026-11-07T00:50:26","slug":"attackers-abuse-microsoft-teams-ad-cs-steal-company-data","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/attackers-abuse-microsoft-teams-ad-cs-steal-company-data\/","title":{"rendered":"Attackers Abuse Microsoft Teams and AD CS to Steal Company Data"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"post-updated\"><em>Updated November 5, 2026 at 11:31 PM ET<\/em><\/div>\n<p>Small businesses can better protect computers, servers and data by tightening remote-support procedures and reviewing how their Active Directory Certificate Services issue credentials. Microsoft investigated two intrusions in which attackers posed as IT support on Microsoft Teams, obtained hands-on control of employee workstations and abused insecure AD CS settings to access privileged identities.<\/p>\n<h2>What Happened<\/h2>\n<p>According to Microsoft, both intrusions began with attackers messaging and calling employees on Microsoft Teams while posing as the company\u2019s own IT or help desk. The attackers gained remote control through Quick Assist, then used vulnerable certificate infrastructure to obtain privileged access. In one case, company data was copied to an external server.<\/p>\n<p>The attackers did not exploit a flaw in Microsoft Teams itself. They combined social engineering with AD CS configurations that allowed unsafe certificate enrollment or authentication.<\/p>\n<h2>Are You Affected?<\/h2>\n<p>The risk applies to organizations that use Active Directory Certificate Services and permit remote assistance through tools such as Quick Assist. The first intrusion involved certificates created for highly privileged accounts through a template with an ESC1 weakness. That weakness lets the requester name the account represented by the certificate, which can allow a low-privileged user to request a certificate for a privileged account.<\/p>\n<p>The second intrusion used the PetitPotam technique to force a domain controller to authenticate to an attacker-controlled machine. The attacker relayed that NTLM authentication to the AD CS web enrollment page, an abuse known as ESC8, and requested a certificate for the domain controller without needing a password.<\/p>\n<p>Microsoft has not attributed either intrusion to a named threat group or provided the dates on which they occurred. The affected Windows Server versions for ESC8 depend on configuration: Extended Protection for Authentication was enabled by default for AD CS in Windows Server 2025, while administrators must enable it manually in Windows Server 2022 and Windows Server 2019.<\/p>\n<p>Administrators can review certificate templates for enrollment settings that allow requesters to name an account or let excessive users enroll. They can also inspect AD CS web enrollment endpoints for HTTPS, EPA and NTLM configuration. Microsoft Defender for Identity posture checks flag templates and endpoints exposed to ESC1 and ESC8.<\/p>\n<h2>What to Do Now<\/h2>\n<ol>\n<li>\n<p>Confirm unexpected IT support requests through a known internal channel before an employee opens Quick Assist, shares a screen or provides a connection code. Limit which outside Microsoft Teams tenants can contact employees and permit only approved remote-support tools.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p>Review sign-in certificate templates. Remove enrollment rights that are not needed, including permissions that let a requester choose the account represented by a certificate.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p>Require HTTPS on AD CS web enrollment endpoints, enable Extended Protection for Authentication and disable NTLM there where possible. Microsoft covers these recommendations in KB5005413.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p>Turn on certificate auditing. If an unauthorized certificate was issued, revoke it and review active Kerberos tickets separately, because revocation does not invalidate tickets that have already been issued.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p>Review automatic identity containment settings. Microsoft found that one privileged account excluded from Defender\u2019s automatic disruption remained usable in the first intrusion, so assign a manual response wherever an account is deliberately excluded.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<h2>How the Attacks Reached Company Systems<\/h2>\n<p>Microsoft said the attackers worked from outside Microsoft Teams tenants with support-themed names, making the contact look familiar. They persuaded employees to open Quick Assist and read back the connection code, giving them direct control of the workstation.<\/p>\n<p>After gaining access, the attackers placed an archive in the Downloads folder, extracted it into a folder designed to resemble a Windows update and ran its contents with a portable Python, Bun or Java runtime. File names alone were not reliable indicators because one script retained the version information of the actual runtime after being renamed.<\/p>\n<p>In the first case, initial calls targeted three users and one workstation, producing certificates for three highly privileged accounts. Microsoft Defender\u2019s automatic attack disruption terminated active sessions and blocked those identities, but one account remained outside the automatic response. About 90 minutes later, another wave targeted 16 users and a second workstation and produced certificates for eight more privileged accounts.<\/p>\n<p>Microsoft said more than 1,000 later attempts to access files over SMB or log in were blocked. The attacker nevertheless used the excluded account to reach a file server and used a renamed copy of Rclone to copy data from a share to an external SFTP server. Microsoft did not state how much credential data or company data was taken.<\/p>\n<p>The second case began with the same social-engineering method, but the certificate template did not have the ESC1 weakness. The attacker used PetitPotam and ESC8 to obtain a certificate for the domain controller. Combined with Kerberos PKINIT, the certificate allowed the attacker to obtain a ticket-granting ticket for the domain controller. Defender raised ESC8 alerts, the customer isolated the workstation and Microsoft reported no further activity.<\/p>\n<h2>How Can Defenders Detect and Respond?<\/h2>\n<p>Microsoft\u2019s report lists Microsoft Defender alerts across Microsoft Teams, endpoints and identity signals. It also provides four advanced hunting queries as starting points for investigation, rather than proof on their own.<\/p>\n<p>The report publishes three SHA-256 hashes tied to the initial-access scripts:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<p>85b6c424117494d3056e88689dbc94c75e9afdb187a339714043aec0da109f17 for the JavaScript initial-access script<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p>f326201269f1ee2f803ae435317507263bb6e0dbfdeb70bd1bb5446e2e46f001 for a Python initial-access script<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<p>06c5c14f043aee3bcc5843b5f50909623d5c9a6239a7c1fba9cddad4111469e7 for a Python initial-access script<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Certificate revocation should be part of a broader response. It does not cancel Kerberos tickets that were issued before revocation, so administrators must review active tickets separately. Accounts omitted from automatic containment also need an assigned manual response because partial containment can leave a privileged route open.<\/p>\n<h2>Why Configuration Matters for Small Businesses<\/h2>\n<p>There is no patch for this attack chain because Microsoft did not identify a software vulnerability in Microsoft Teams. The entry method relied on social engineering, while certificate abuse depended on how AD CS was configured.<\/p>\n<p>The ESC1 and ESC8 weaknesses were named by researchers in 2021, and PetitPotam was disclosed in the same year. Microsoft had also documented the Microsoft Teams help-desk-to-remote-access method earlier in 2026. The new detail is that these techniques appeared together in two intrusions, alongside the operational gap created by an excluded privileged account.<\/p>\n<h2>FAQ<\/h2>\n<h3>Which Microsoft Teams Accounts Are Affected by These Attacks?<\/h3>\n<p>The source does not identify affected accounts or say that the attackers compromised Microsoft Teams itself. They contacted employees from outside tenants with support-themed names and persuaded staff to grant remote control through Quick Assist.<\/p>\n<h3>What Are the ESC1 and ESC8 Certificate Weaknesses?<\/h3>\n<p>ESC1 lets a certificate requester name the account represented by the certificate, allowing a low-privileged user to request a certificate for a privileged account. ESC8 involves relaying an NTLM login to an AD CS web enrollment page to request a certificate without a password.<\/p>\n<h3>Does Revoking a Stolen Certificate Stop an Attacker?<\/h3>\n<p>No. Microsoft states that revoking a certificate does not cancel Kerberos tickets that have already been issued. Administrators must revoke the certificate and review active tickets separately.<\/p>\n<h2>BizScoreAI<\/h2>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/bizscoreai.com\/add-listing\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><img decoding=\"async\" data-src=\"https:\/\/bizscoreai.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/04\/BizScoreAI-Social-image.jpg\" alt=\"BizScoreAI, which includes the free listing check\" src=\"data:image\/svg+xml;base64,PHN2ZyB3aWR0aD0iMSIgaGVpZ2h0PSIxIiB4bWxucz0iaHR0cDovL3d3dy53My5vcmcvMjAwMC9zdmciPjwvc3ZnPg==\" class=\"lazyload\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>BizScoreAI scores how visible a business is to AI search and shows what its listing looks like to the engines people ask. <a href=\"https:\/\/bizscoreai.com\/add-listing\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Open the free listing check<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><script type=\"application\/ld+json\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"FAQPage\",\"mainEntity\":[{\"@type\":\"Question\",\"name\":\"Which Microsoft Teams Accounts Are Affected by These Attacks?\",\"acceptedAnswer\":{\"@type\":\"Answer\",\"text\":\"The source does not identify affected accounts or say that the attackers compromised Microsoft Teams itself. They contacted employees from outside tenants with support-themed names and persuaded staff to grant remote control through Quick Assist.\"}},{\"@type\":\"Question\",\"name\":\"What Are the ESC1 and ESC8 Certificate Weaknesses?\",\"acceptedAnswer\":{\"@type\":\"Answer\",\"text\":\"ESC1 lets a certificate requester name the account represented by the certificate, allowing a low-privileged user to request a certificate for a privileged account. ESC8 involves relaying an NTLM login to an AD CS web enrollment page to request a certificate without a password.\"}},{\"@type\":\"Question\",\"name\":\"Does Revoking a Stolen Certificate Stop an Attacker?\",\"acceptedAnswer\":{\"@type\":\"Answer\",\"text\":\"No. Microsoft states that revoking a certificate does not cancel Kerberos tickets that have already been issued. Administrators must revoke the certificate and review active tickets separately.\"}}]}]}<\/script><\/p>\n<div class=\"source-disclaimer\"><em>This article reports on publicly available information from the sources listed below. We have no reason to believe it is inaccurate, but we have not independently verified every claim, and details may change as the story develops.<\/em><\/div>\n<section class=\"post-sources\">\n<h2>Sources<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/thehackernews.com\/2026\/11\/attackers-pose-as-it-support-on.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">Attackers Pose as IT Support on Microsoft Teams, Abuse AD CS to Steal Company Data, thehackernews.com, Nov 2, 2026<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.php.net\/manual\/en\/session.security.ini.php\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">php.net<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/section>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Microsoft investigated two intrusions that combined Teams social engineering with insecure AD CS settings to gain privileged access and copy company data.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":996,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-978","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/978","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=978"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/978\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":979,"href":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/978\/revisions\/979"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/996"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=978"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=978"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=978"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}