{"id":982,"date":"2026-11-06T12:10:21","date_gmt":"2026-11-06T12:10:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/ghostaction-hacking-wave-attackers-github\/"},"modified":"2026-11-06T12:10:22","modified_gmt":"2026-11-06T12:10:22","slug":"ghostaction-hacking-wave-attackers-github","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/ghostaction-hacking-wave-attackers-github\/","title":{"rendered":"GhostAction Hacking Wave Fizzles, but Attackers Lurk on in GitHub"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"post-updated\"><em>Updated November 6, 2026 at 6:02 AM ET<\/em><\/div>\n<p>GitHub blocked most malicious workflows in the latest GhostAction supply chain campaign, but attackers retained access to nearly 1,800 compromised accounts. Small organizations using GitHub should review repository branches, revoke exposed tokens and rotate credentials that may have been committed or stored in affected repositories.<\/p>\n<h2>What Happened<\/h2>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.darkreading.com\/application-security\/ghostaction-hacking-wave-fizzles-attackers-github\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Dark Reading reports<\/a> that attackers continued the GhostAction campaign by compromising developer accounts and injecting malicious workflow files into repositories. GitHub identified and prevented the malicious workflows from executing, but the latest wave did not remove the attackers&#8217; access to affected accounts.<\/p>\n<h2>Are You Affected?<\/h2>\n<p>The campaign targets organizations whose developer accounts or repositories have been compromised. Malicious workflows can seek repository secrets, package publishing tokens, GitHub personal access tokens, credentials embedded in source code, AI-provider API keys and AWS-related GitHub OIDC tokens. One payload installs a Node.js credential stealer on local developer machines and disguises it as a Visual Studio Code task.<\/p>\n<p>GitGuardian reported that the operator pushed 72,000 commits to 23,000 public repositories between Oct. 13 and 21, including 8,000 new targets. An earlier Oct. 8 to 12 wave placed a security-audit.yml workflow in roughly 30,000 repositories. GitHub has not published a list of affected accounts or repositories, so owners should review their branches and account activity for signs of the malicious workflow files.<\/p>\n<p>GitGuardian said it had no evidence that any of the latest payloads ran successfully. It also reported that 1,382 of 1,792 compromised accounts had already been used during the Oct. 8 wave, indicating that stolen tokens continued to work.<\/p>\n<h2>What to Do Now<\/h2>\n<ol>\n<li>Search every branch of each repository for the malicious workflow files listed in GitGuardian&#8217;s indicators of compromise, and delete any matches.<\/li>\n<li>Revoke all tokens associated with any developer account that shows signs of compromise, including GitHub personal access tokens and package publishing tokens.<\/li>\n<li>Rotate every credential committed to an affected repository or its Git history, along with every GitHub Actions secret and wiki credential.<\/li>\n<li>Review account and repository activity for unauthorized commits, workflow changes, new files, token use and other unexpected actions.<\/li>\n<li>Check developer workstations for the Node.js credential stealer, particularly files or Visual Studio Code tasks that imitate font-related operations.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<h2>How the Campaign Works<\/h2>\n<p>GhostAction begins with compromised developer accounts. Attackers add workflow files that GitHub Actions may trust and execute when repository events occur, such as a commit or pull request. The malicious workflows can collect credentials and tokens that support further access across repositories, CI\/CD systems and cloud environments.<\/p>\n<p>GitGuardian observed five payload types during the campaign. They searched GitHub-hosted source code and Git history for credentials, targeted self-hosted runners, searched runner repositories and wikis for credentials including AI-provider API keys, requested GitHub OIDC tokens for AWS access, and installed the credential stealer disguised as a Visual Studio Code task.<\/p>\n<p>The campaign remains capable of causing disruption because the malicious workflow files can reach several types of secrets. One payload specifically sought OIDC tokens that could allow an attacker to assume AWS roles and gain cloud account access, which could move an intrusion beyond GitHub into internal environments with fewer platform-level protections.<\/p>\n<h2>Tj-Actions Changed-Files Compromise<\/h2>\n<p>The GhostAction campaign shares a core mechanism with the earlier 2025 tj-actions changed-files compromise: both abused GitHub Actions workflows to capture developer secrets and extend access across repositories. The tj-actions attack did not begin with malicious workflow files injected into individual projects. It started with a stolen SpotBugs Personal Access Token, moved through reviewdog, and ended with attackers tampering with the popular tj-actions\/changed-files GitHub Action.<\/p>\n<p>The compromise occurred between March 10 and March 14, 2025. More than 23,000 GitHub repositories used the compromised change-detection tool. For affected public repositories, altered workflows could expose API keys, passwords, access tokens, and other secrets through workflow logs where anyone who knew where to look could see them.<\/p>\n<p>That earlier event shows how a trusted action can expose credentials without each repository owner directly introducing a malicious workflow. It also strengthens the case for reviewing every branch, revoking exposed tokens, and rotating credentials that may have been committed or stored in affected repositories.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.theregister.com\/software\/2025\/04\/07\/stolen-spotbugs-tokens-sparked-the-massive-github-attack\/1176250\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Tj-actions changed-files compromise<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>What Can Small Businesses Do?<\/h2>\n<p>Small development teams can limit the damage by keeping developer accounts, repository permissions and CI credentials under close review. Revocation and rotation should cover all token types because the same stolen credentials may remain usable after a malicious workflow is removed.<\/p>\n<p>GitHub-hosted and self-hosted runners require different checks. Organizations using GitHub-hosted runners should examine source repositories and Git history, while those using self-hosted runners should also inspect the runner environment and associated credentials. Removing a workflow file does not undo a credential theft, so any exposed secret should be treated as compromised until it is replaced.<\/p>\n<h2>FAQ<\/h2>\n<h3>What Is the GhostAction Campaign?<\/h3>\n<p>GhostAction targets GitHub by compromising developer accounts and adding malicious GitHub Actions workflow files to repositories. Those workflows attempt to steal repository secrets, package publishing tokens, GitHub personal access tokens, credentials in source code and other access information.<\/p>\n<h3>Did the Latest GhostAction Attacks Succeed?<\/h3>\n<p>GitHub identified and prevented execution of the malicious workflows, and GitGuardian reported no evidence that the latest payloads ran successfully. The attackers still had access to nearly 1,800 compromised accounts, and many stolen tokens continued working.<\/p>\n<h3>What Should Organizations Do After a GhostAction Compromise?<\/h3>\n<p>Delete the listed malicious files from every repository branch, revoke all tokens associated with affected accounts, rotate credentials found in the affected repository or its history, and replace every GitHub Actions secret and wiki credential. Organizations should also review account and repository activity for unauthorized changes.<\/p>\n<h3>Can GhostAction Reach Self-Hosted Runners and Cloud Accounts?<\/h3>\n<p>Yes. GitGuardian observed payloads targeting self-hosted CI runners and GitHub OIDC tokens that could request access to AWS roles. These payloads create a path from repository compromise toward internal runners and cloud accounts.<\/p>\n<p><script type=\"application\/ld+json\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"FAQPage\",\"mainEntity\":[{\"@type\":\"Question\",\"name\":\"What Is the GhostAction Campaign?\",\"acceptedAnswer\":{\"@type\":\"Answer\",\"text\":\"GhostAction targets GitHub by compromising developer accounts and adding malicious GitHub Actions workflow files to repositories. Those workflows attempt to steal repository secrets, package publishing tokens, GitHub personal access tokens, credentials in source code and other access information.\"}},{\"@type\":\"Question\",\"name\":\"Did the Latest GhostAction Attacks Succeed?\",\"acceptedAnswer\":{\"@type\":\"Answer\",\"text\":\"GitHub identified and prevented execution of the malicious workflows, and GitGuardian reported no evidence that the latest payloads ran successfully. The attackers still had access to nearly 1,800 compromised accounts, and many stolen tokens continued working.\"}},{\"@type\":\"Question\",\"name\":\"What Should Organizations Do After a GhostAction Compromise?\",\"acceptedAnswer\":{\"@type\":\"Answer\",\"text\":\"Delete the listed malicious files from every repository branch, revoke all tokens associated with affected accounts, rotate credentials found in the affected repository or its history, and replace every GitHub Actions secret and wiki credential. Organizations should also review account and repository activity for unauthorized changes.\"}}]}]}<\/script><\/p>\n<div class=\"source-disclaimer\"><em>This article reports on publicly available information from the sources listed below. We have no reason to believe it is inaccurate, but we have not independently verified every claim, and details may change as the story develops.<\/em><\/div>\n<section class=\"post-sources\">\n<h2>Sources<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.darkreading.com\/application-security\/ghostaction-hacking-wave-fizzles-attackers-github\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">GhostAction Hacking Wave Fizzles, But Attackers Lurk on in GitHub, darkreading.com, Oct 28, 2026<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.theregister.com\/software\/2025\/04\/07\/stolen-spotbugs-tokens-sparked-the-massive-github-attack\/1176250\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener nofollow\">theregister.com<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/section>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>GitHub blocked most malicious GhostAction workflows, but attackers retained access to nearly 1,800 compromised accounts. Small teams should check repositories<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":981,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-982","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/982","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=982"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/982\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":983,"href":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/982\/revisions\/983"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/981"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=982"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=982"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/managedt.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=982"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}