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ConnectWise Suspends Cloud Backup After Attackers Abuse Microsoft 365 Access

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ConnectWise cloud backup suspended after Microsoft 365 credential attack

ConnectWise suspended Cloud Backup, SaaS Security and Cloud Management after attackers used a compromised Cloud Backup credential to enter Microsoft 365 tenants. Microsoft later attributed the supply chain compromise to Storm-0940, which used the ARTEX framework to automate attacks, while urging affected organizations to review service principal sign-ins and changes to credentials and privileges.

What Is Officially Confirmed?

Confirmed by ConnectWise on October 15 to October 19: ConnectWise discovered the incident on October 15, engaged an outside forensics firm, disabled seven application identities on October 17, revoked their certificates and invalidated the shared Cloud Backup credential. The company said stored backups remained encrypted and isolated, with no evidence they had been accessed. Its investigation and remediation guidance covers application status, sign-in and audit records, credentials, permissions, administrator roles and possible hidden access.

Confirmed by Microsoft on October 21: Microsoft assessed that Storm-0940, a China-state-aligned actor, was responsible. Microsoft said the actor used ARTEX to automate attacks and abused authorized applications to authenticate without an interactive user sign-in. Microsoft also found AI-accelerated follow-on activity through Microsoft Graph, including reconnaissance, application credential changes and attempts to alter privileges. According to Microsoft Threat Intelligence, the activity did not result from a compromise of or vulnerability in Microsoft corporate systems, products or services. Microsoft cautioned that successful authentication does not necessarily mean customer data was accessed or exfiltrated.

Found by Huntress: Huntress confirmed unauthorized access to at least 162 Microsoft 365 tenants. It reported nearly 1,000 accounts with sign-in attempts from the identified address and more than 300 successful sign-ins. In one account it examined in detail, Huntress found no sign of email or file access, while noting that Microsoft does not record some forms of application data reads.

Still unresolved: ConnectWise said the original credential-exposure mechanism remained under investigation and that it had not established whether a product vulnerability contributed. Microsoft likewise said the presence of an affected application or successful authentication does not establish that customer data was accessed or exfiltrated.

How the Attack Reached Customer Tenants

ConnectWise Cloud Backup, formerly SkyKick, copies Microsoft 365 email, OneDrive and SharePoint files, and Teams chats for later restoration after accidental deletion or ransomware. ConnectWise acquired it with SkyKick in 2024. An administrator grants the backup application broad permissions through Microsoft Entra ID, Microsoft’s identity system, after which it operates as an application identity, or service principal, and can read and write data without a person signing in.

ConnectWise sells most of its products to managed service providers, or MSPs, which manage technology for small and mid-sized organizations. The company says more than 100,000 MSPs use its platform, and an MSP may manage dozens or hundreds of client organizations. According to Huntress, the compromised credential could provide access to the authorized tenants.

According to Microsoft Threat Intelligence, Storm-0940 began using ARTEX as early as September 2026 to target hundreds of organizations. Microsoft reported that the agentic AI penetration-testing framework accelerated the abuse of compromised application identities in Microsoft 365 customer environments. In multiple affected environments, Microsoft observed follow-on activity involving Microsoft Graph, application credentials and privilege changes.

What the Attackers Changed

Huntress reported that other ConnectWise applications gave themselves administrator roles in roughly 50 of the organizations it monitored, mostly Exchange Administrator. The software signature matched ConnectWise automation, which Huntress said suggested the company’s automation rather than the attacker, although ConnectWise had not confirmed that explanation.

In one clearly hostile case, the ConnectWise Cloud Management app for Microsoft Teams made itself a global administrator. Within about five minutes, it added credentials to two trusted applications: an MSP management application and the Huntress Security Platform. Those credentials were set to remain valid until 2028, giving whoever created them a way back in that would survive the shutdown of ConnectWise’s apps.

Todyl reported on October 26 that Microsoft’s investigation had identified unauthorized credential modifications and privileged role changes in some customer environments. Todyl also reported that Microsoft found attempted sign-ins against more than 2,250 tenants using multiple ConnectWise application credentials.

What to Do Now

Ask the administrator or MSP handling the organization’s Microsoft 365 tenant to complete the following checks. Keep relevant records before changing affected identities so the review remains available for investigation.

Verification Question Evidence to Retain Source-Backed Action
Is an affected ConnectWise application present? The application list, application status and relevant Microsoft Entra ID records. Follow ConnectWise’s remediation guidance for affected applications.
Did a service principal produce suspicious sign-ins? Service principal sign-in records for the affected application and the activity associated with 144.172.64[.]128. Review service principal sign-ins rather than relying only on the default user sign-in view.
Were credentials added after October 13? Application credential records, creation details and expiry dates. Review every application for newly added credentials, including credentials set to remain valid until 2028 or later.
Did an application receive an unexpected administrator role? Directory role assignment records and relevant audit events. Review administrator roles, including Exchange Administrator and global administrator assignments.
Were mailbox settings changed? Mailbox audit records and the identity responsible for each change. Check for changed mailbox settings and other possible hidden access described in ConnectWise’s guide.
Has restoration received a confirmed plan? The written restoration status, expected sequence and service dependencies. Obtain a current restoration plan from ConnectWise or the MSP before re-enabling affected application connections.
Technical Notes for the IT Team

ConnectWise says access tokens issued before the October 17 shutdown may remain usable until they expire. Disabling the applications does not undo credentials, roles or other access already added inside a customer account, so those items must be found and removed by the organization. Its guide also covers changed mailbox settings and compromised identities beyond the original application.

Microsoft recommends reviewing service principal sign-ins, investigating unexpected application credential or privilege changes, following ConnectWise’s containment guidance and preserving relevant evidence.

Prepare for Backup Disruption

Ask the MSP whether the organization has an independent recovery copy of critical email, files and collaboration data. Ask whether a restore has been tested and which business services depend on Cloud Backup for recovery.

Request a written priority-restoration plan that identifies who receives and approves urgent requests, which services are restored first and how restoration dependencies will be handled. Todyl reported on October 26 that ConnectWise had completed an account and credential reset in the affected Cloud Backup environment, but affected application connections should remain disabled until formal restoration instructions are available.

Service Status and Backup Availability

As of October 19, ConnectWise Cloud Backup, SaaS Security and Cloud Management remained suspended. No scheduled backups were running, customers could not restore data and ConnectWise could not yet provide a restoration time. SaaS Security and Cloud Management were suspended because they are integrated with Cloud Backup.

ConnectWise said its stored backups remained encrypted and isolated and that it had no evidence they had been accessed. That vendor statement does not resolve the separate question of whether customer Microsoft 365 data was read or taken.

FAQ

What Is ConnectWise Cloud Backup?

ConnectWise Cloud Backup, formerly SkyKick, copies Microsoft 365 email, OneDrive files, SharePoint files and Teams chats for restoration after accidental deletion or ransomware. ConnectWise acquired it with SkyKick in 2024.

Which ConnectWise Services Are Suspended?

As of October 19, ConnectWise Cloud Backup, SaaS Security and Cloud Management were suspended because they are integrated with Cloud Backup. No scheduled backups were running, customers could not restore data and ConnectWise had not provided a restoration time.

How Can an IT Provider Check Whether Microsoft 365 Was Accessed?

The IT provider should review service principal sign-ins for the affected ConnectWise applications, inspect audit records for credentials and privilege changes, check administrator roles and mailbox settings, and follow ConnectWise’s investigation and remediation guidance. Follow the remediation guidance in ConnectWise’s guide for affected applications.

Related coverage

This article reports on publicly available information from the sources listed below. We have no reason to believe it is inaccurate, but we have not independently verified every claim, and details may change as the story develops.

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