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ConnectWise Disables Cloud Backup After Microsoft 365 Credential Incident

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ConnectWise cloud backup server disconnected after Microsoft 365 credential incident
Updated October 31, 2026 at 12:21 AM ET

Microsoft assesses that Storm-0940 was responsible for the recently disclosed ConnectWise supply chain compromise of a multi-tenant application. ConnectWise has disabled Cloud Backup and several related services while investigation and remediation efforts continue.

What happened

Dark Reading reported that ConnectWise identified unauthorized access on October 14 to application identities associated with ConnectWise Cloud Backup, formerly SkyKick. The company disabled Cloud Backup for partners and clients on October 17, then disabled SaaS Security and Cloud Management over the weekend as the investigation and remediation efforts continued. Backups, restores, SaaS Security monitoring and Cloud Management functions remain unavailable.

Microsoft Security Research and Microsoft Threat Intelligence reported on October 21 that Storm-0940 used ARTEX to attempt to sign in to more than 2,250 tenants. Microsoft said the actor used ARTEX to accelerate activity to machine speed after the unauthorized access, allowing compromised applications to authenticate to customer environments without an interactive user sign-in.

Microsoft also observed follow-on activity through Microsoft Graph, including reconnaissance, application credential changes and attempts to alter privileges, while noting that successful authentication does not necessarily mean customer data was accessed or removed.

Are you affected?

ConnectWise Cloud Backup is a SaaS backup service for Microsoft 365 data. Customer organizations grant it permissions inside their Microsoft 365 and Entra environments, allowing it to access Exchange mailboxes, OneDrive, SharePoint, Teams and other workloads, depending on the permissions granted.

The risk extends to organizations that use the product through a managed service provider. ConnectWise recommends checking the organization’s own Microsoft 365 tenant and each managed customer tenant, including dormant SkyKick connections. The affected Microsoft Entra application ID is 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae.

ConnectWise says it has not identified confirmed downstream customer compromise, although downstream impact remains under investigation. The company also says it lacks independent visibility into customer Microsoft 365 environments and cannot independently determine whether a particular tenant experienced unauthorized activity.

Security firms Huntress and Todyl take a stricter view. Huntress reported sign-in activity linked to more than 1,000 Entra tenants from an IP address associated with the unauthorized activity, with successful sign-ins in more than 300 tenants. It also reported a ConnectWise application obtaining Global Administrator access in two tenants and adding credentials for other applications. According to Dark Reading, Todyl recommended that organizations presume compromise for tenants with the Cloud Backup application enabled, and a Todyl spokesperson said the actor accessed SkyKick partner tenants in strict tenant-ID order, including tenants where the app had never been installed.

ConnectWise has not said whether partner data, including tenant lists, was exposed. It has also not confirmed that a specific vulnerability was exploited in the attack chain. Microsoft has assessed that Storm-0940 was responsible for the ConnectWise supply chain compromise.

What to do now

  1. Review ConnectWise’s disclosure status post and indicators of compromise. Check the organization’s Microsoft 365 tenant and every managed customer tenant, including dormant SkyKick connections.

  2. Review service principal sign-ins for the affected application and related Microsoft 365 applications. Use the indicators in ConnectWise’s current containment guidance and investigate unexpected authentication.

  3. Check for unexpected application credential changes, newly added credentials and privilege changes. Review administrator roles, including Global Administrator assignments, and look for persistence added through Microsoft Graph.

  4. Follow ConnectWise’s published containment guidance and preserve relevant evidence for investigation while carrying out the review.

  5. Confirm data retention and restore options with ConnectWise while backups and restores remain unavailable. If the product was enabled in the tenant, document the affected tenant and escalate unresolved authentication or permission activity.

Why the Microsoft 365 permissions matter

The application’s access to Microsoft 365 data means a credential incident can extend beyond the backup service. Permissions may cover email, files, collaboration data and administrative functions, so reviewing the backup application alone does not establish the full tenant impact.

ConnectWise can review its application identities and monitored systems, but customer tenant activity must be checked by the organizations and managed service providers responsible for those tenants. A small-business IT team should review whether the backup application was enabled and what access it received.

Microsoft says Storm-0940’s activity did not result from a compromise of or vulnerability in Microsoft corporate systems, products or services. The company did observe Storm-0940-initiated authentication and follow-on activity in multiple customer environments, which is why its guidance calls for reviews of service principal sign-ins, application credentials and privilege changes.

What remains under investigation

ConnectWise has revoked certificates used by affected application connections, invalidated the affected shared Cloud Backup credentials, and rotated or disabled compromised identities. It engaged an incident response firm and said its monitored environments showed no successful threat activity after mitigation.

The company also said it had no indicators that Cloud Backup partner backup data had been compromised. That assessment does not settle the status of every customer tenant because successful sign-in and specific data access are separate questions. Microsoft likewise said that successful authentication does not necessarily indicate that customer data was accessed or removed.

Microsoft did not respond to Dark Reading’s request for comment at the time of that report. The open questions include the original credential exposure mechanism, whether partner data or tenant lists was exposed, and what occurred in each live Microsoft 365 tenant. ConnectWise continued authentication monitoring, permission review and forensic analysis.

FAQ

Is ConnectWise Cloud Backup currently available?

ConnectWise disabled Cloud Backup for partners and clients on October 17. Backups and restores remained unavailable while the investigation and remediation work continued. SaaS Security monitoring and Cloud Management functions were also disabled over the weekend.

Which Microsoft 365 environments should be checked?

Check the organization’s own Microsoft 365 tenant and each managed customer tenant, including dormant SkyKick connections.

What should organizations check after the ConnectWise credential incident?

Review service principal sign-ins, application credentials and administrator roles for the affected application and related Microsoft 365 applications. Follow ConnectWise’s containment guidance, investigate unexpected privilege changes and preserve relevant evidence.

Related coverage

This article reports on publicly available information from the sources listed below. We have no reason to believe it is inaccurate, but we have not independently verified every claim, and details may change as the story develops.

Sources

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